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Bending Toward Justice:
The Posthumous Pardon of
Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flippert
DARRYLW. JACKSON, JEFFREYH. SvITH, EDWARD H. SissoN,
AND HELENE T. KRASNOFP?

"The moral arc of the universe is long, but it bends toward justice."'
INTRODUCTION

On February 19, 1999, President William Jefferson Clinton granted the first
posthumous Presidential pardon in our nation's history. The recipient was Lt. Henry
Ossian Flipper, the first African-American graduate of West Point and the first
African-American commissioned officer in the regular United States Army. Lt.
Flipper was dismissed from the Army in 1881 after a court-martial, for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. His court-martial and dismissal have long
been seen as a grave miscarriage ofjustice.
In seeking a posthumous pardon for Lt. Flipper, we faced considerable barriers.
It has long been the policy of the Pardon Attorney of the U.S. Department of Justice
not to accept or process posthumous pardon applications. The government's
position is rooted in cases decided during the early days of our country. The Pardon
Attorney asserts that these cases and authorities dictate that posthumous pardons
cannot and should not be granted by the President.
The briefwe submitted to the President in support of our pardon petition attacked
those legal and policy barriers, and also set forth the factual and legal case for the
pardon.' In researching the brief, we examined evidence that is over 100 years old,
including Lt. Flipper's court-martial, and other records. Our research took us to
England; we also examined our own constitutional authorities, and conducted
research in various States.
TBE FACTUAL CAsE FOR LT. FLIPPER'S PosTHUMous
PARDON

The facts favoring a posthumous pardon for Lt. Flipper are compelling and are
set forth in the Statement of Facts portion of the brief. Lt. Flipper was an American
patriot and hero, who met with a miscarriage of justice because of his race.
Restoring his good name and remedying the injustice he suffered was an important
step forward for our nation, especially in light of the significance of Lt. Flipper's
contributions to his country.

t 0 1999 DanylW. Jackson, Jeff-ey H.Smith, Edward H. Sisson, and Helene T. Krasnoff.
* The authors are attorneys at the law firm of Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., who
represented the family of Lt Flipper in seeking a posthumous pardon.
a. Theodore Parker, Abolitionist
b. The brief is reprinted following this Introduction.
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Lt. Flipperat West Pointand as a Soldier
As a soldier, Lt. Flipper was a trailblazer who, despite the overwhelming
resistance he faced, cleared the path for others who, until then, had been barred
from fully serving in the military. Born a slave in Thomasville, Georgia in 1856, he
was the fifth African American to enter West Point, but the first to graduate. He
endured unremitting racial ostracism from his fellow cadets during his West Point
years.
He went on to become the first African-American officer to command units of the
famed "Buffalo Soldiers," who served in the 9th and 10th Cavalry. He was tested
in battle. As an Army engineer, he constructed "Flipper's Ditch," a system that
drained the malaria-filled swamps around Ft Sill, Oklahoma, and saved many lives.
It is still in use today-over 100 years after its construction. No other engineer the
Army had assigned to this task had been able to accomplish it. In 1975, the U.S.
Department of the Interior designated Flipper's Ditch a National Historic
Landmark.
The CourtMartialTrial
In 1881, Lt. Flipper was tried at Ft. Davis, Texas, on charges of embezzlement
and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. The charges arose from
monies found to be missing in connection with his duties as Acting Commissary of
Subsistence at that post. After a 30-day trial, Lt. Flipper was found not guilty of
embezzlement, but guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer-the mandatory penalty
for which was dismissal from the Army. There was no judicial review provided for
at that time, and the conviction was affirmed by President Chester A. Arthur,
whereupon, the commissioned officer corps of the Army returned to its prior status
of being all white.
Lt. Flipper'sPost-Army Life
After his dismissal from the Army, Lt. Flipper continued his life in a truly heroic
manner. Since the quality of the life one has lived post-conviction is the factual
touchstone for granting a pardon, Lt. Flipper unquestionably met the standard.
Indeed, his accomplishments and contributions to his country undoubtedly far
exceed those of others who seek presidential pardons.
Lt. Flipper established his own business as a civil and mining engineer. As a
result of his formidable skills, he was called back into service by the U.S.
government. He served as a Special Agent of the U.S. Department of Justice,
assigned to the U.S. Attorney for the Court of Land Claims. He later served as a
staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as a Special Assistant
to the Secretary of the Interior. He used his skills as an engineer, a scholar and
translator in these various positions. His work was widely praised by the high
government officials under whom he worked. He also was employed by a number
of private companies.
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THE FIGHT TO CLEAR LT. FLIPPER'S NAME
Despite his contributions, Lt. Flipper was unsuccessful in his fight to clear his
name. He attempted to do so through legislative means, as well as by attempting to
see the President. He died in Atlanta, Georgia, at age eighty-four.
Others continued where Lt. Flipper's efforts had ended. In the 1970s, Lt.
Flipper's niece, Irsle Flipper King, along with a Georgia schoolteacher, Ray 0.
MacColl, presented the Army with a petition seeking a pardon for Lt. Flipper, as
well as a posthumous honorable discharge. After reviewing the matter, the Army
Board for Correction of Military Appeals ("ABCMR"), in 1977, granted a
posthumous honorable discharge to Lt. Flipper, finding that his treatment was
"unduly harsh" and"unjust."0 The ABCMR stated that it lacked the power to grant
him a pardon, however, because the Constitution grants the pardon power
exclusively to the President.
Posthumous Honors
After the ABCMR's action, a procession of additional posthumous honors were
bestowed upon Lt. Flipper by the State of Georgia, West Point, the Army, and the
United States. In 1977, the Governor of Georgia proclaimed "Henry 0. Flipper
Day." That same year, West Point dedicated a bust and a portion of its Library in
Lt Flipper's honor, and also established an award in his name to be given annually
to a cadet who has overcome adversity. In 1978, the Army reburied Lt. Flipper in
his hometown of Thomasville, Georgia, with full military honors. In 1989, Georgia
placed an historical marker at his gravesite. As a result of legislation introduced in
the Congress, the U.S. Postal facility in Thomasville, Georgia was named after Lt.
Flipper in December 1998.
However, the final step in clearing his name-obtaining a presidential
pardon-remained to be accomplished.
TiE LEGAL CASE FOR THE PARDON

In the Argument portion of the brief, we set forth the legal support favoring a
posthumous pardon for Lt. Flipper. Therein, we also rebut the Pardon Attorney's
long-standing legal and policy arguments against granting posthumous pardons.
In Part I, we argue that presidential pardons are granted to remove stigma, to
signal forgiveness, and to correct injustices. Part II discusses why the Pardon
Attorney's position that posthumous pardon requests cannot be granted is flawed.
Part III reviews the authorities that show the President has the power to grant
posthumous pardons. Part IV discusses the special responsibility that the President
has as Commander in Chief to ensure the integrity of the military justice system.
Part V establishes that the President's pardon power is coextensive with that of the
British Crown, which has granted posthumous pardons. In Part VI, we argue that

c. Department of the Army, Army Board for Correction of Military Records ("ABCMR")
Proceedings, Nov. 17,1976, at 7.
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the president's pardon power is similar to that of state governors, who have granted
posthumous pardons. Part VII rebuts the Pardon Attorney's concern that granting
Lt Flipper a posthumous pardon would cause the "floodgates" to open to additional
requests. Finally, Part VIII discusses why granting the pardon would promote the
public welfare, which is the modem legal standard for whether a pardon should be
granted.

TBE PosTHuMous PARDON ISGRANT=D
In granting Lt. Flipper a posthumous pardon on February 19, 1999, President
Clinton remedied a grave injustice that had stood for far too long. Three generations
of Lt. Flipper's relatives from around the country attended the White House
ceremony at which the pardon was granted. By virtue of his accomplishments, Lt.
Flipper has been, and will continue to be written about and studied. As the
President stated, "This good man has now completely recovered his good name."
That is as it should be-and nearly sixty years after his death, Lt. Flipper continues
in his role as a trailblazer.

Executive Grant of Clemency
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TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR PARDON FOR
SECOND LIEUTENANT HENRY OSSIAN FLIPPER
I0 T CAVALRY, UNTED STATES ARMY
The First African-American Graduate
of the United States Military Academy, 1877
Convicted December 8, 1881,
"Of Conduct Unbecoming An Officer"
by General Court-Martial at Fort Davis, Texas
and Sentenced to be
Dismissed from the Army June 30, 1882

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR
PARDON'

For Petitioner:
Darryl W. Jackson, Esq.Jeffrey H. Smith, Esq.
Edward H. Sisson, Esq.
Helene T. Krasnoff, Esq.
ARNOLD & PORTER
555 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 942-5000
July 21, 1998

* This brief is published almost entirely in its original form save a few, minor editorial
changes implemented solely for formatting purposes. Additional citations to the sources cited
herein as exhibits are provided in the Appendix following the Brief.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Lt. Flipper's Court-Martial and Its Review

Lt. Henry Ossian Flipper, born a slave in Thomasville, Georgia, was the first
African-American to graduate from the United States Military Academy at West
Point, in 1877, and was the first African-American commissioned officer in the
regular United States Army. After four years' service with various segregated units
including the 101 Cavalry, in 1881 he became Acting Commissary of Subsistence
at Fort Davis, Texas. He had received no training for this position. In this capacity,
Lt. Flipper received payments from soldiers buying goods from the Army at this
remote frontier post. In July of that year, he discovered that some $2,378 in U.S.
Government funds entrusted to his care was missing. Fearful that the loss would be
used as a pretext to end his Army career, and unable to seek out any fellow officer
for advice due to the extreme isolation imposed on him throughout his Army career
as a result of his race, he kept silent about the loss. He planned to replace the
money with, inter alia $2,500 he expected at any moment from the publishers of
a book he had written about his experiences at the Military Academy, A Colored
Cadet at West Point.' In the meantime, he submitted inaccurate statements
the funds to his commanding officer, Col. William Shafter,
concerning the status of
2
to prevent discovery.
His book receipts did not arrive before the shortfall was discovered. Col. Shafter
arrested Lt. Flipper and jailed him in the guardhouse, in violation of regulations
barring such imprisonment of officers. The War Department, upon learing of this
blatant mistreatment of Lt. Flipper, telegraphed General C.C. Augur, Commander
of the Army Department of Texas:
Papers relative to Lieut. Flipper's arrest and confinement received. Both the
Secretary of War and the General of the Army require that this officer must have
the same treatment as though he were white.
This telegram demonstrates that the highest levels of the Army felt that
Col. Shafter's treatment of Lt. Flipper reflected racial prejudice. However, the
telegram was not admitted at the trial.
Lt Flipper's good character in the local community was so strong that more than
a dozen of his friends and acquaintances took up a collection and, within 48 hours,
made good the entire loss. Nevertheless, Col. Shafter drew up charges accusing
Lt Flipper of violations of military discipline, in particular, of violating the 60 t' and
61't Articles of War. He alleged that Lt. Flipper had embezzled the missing
commissary funds and had engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer by failing to
report to his superiors that the funds were missing.
Lt. Flipper pled not guilty to all charges. The thirty days of testimony and
argument at his trial included the testimony of many witnesses attesting to

1. This bookis still in print; see reprint edition by Ayer Co., Salem, New Hampshire (1991).
2. Trial transcript at 506 (copy available on request). The facts surrounding the conviction
are discussed in detail in Lt. Flipper's Pardon Petition at pages 6-13.
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Lt. Flipper's good character and frugal habits, including Army officers.3 The courtmartial found Lt. Flipper not guilty of the lead charge of embezzlement. However,
he was found guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer, based upon his inaccurate
financial reporting to Col. Shafter. 4 Thus, Lt. Flipper's only crime was his attempt
to postpone discovery of the deficiency in the funds, for the sole purpose of giving
himself more time to correct the deficiency in the accounts prior to discovery-a
deficiency which was not his fault and which he swiftly made up, in any event.
Pursuant to the procedures in place at that time, there was no judicial review of
the court-martial finding. The only available review was through the military chain
of command, with President Chester A. Arthur, in his capacity as Commander in
Chief of the Army, as the final reviewing authority.
On intermediate review of the court-martial's finding, the Judge Advocate
General of the Army, Gen. Swaim, found that Lt. Flipper's conduct did not warrant
the mandatory discharge that conviction for conduct unbecoming an officer entailed,
and recommended that the President mitigate the conviction. Gen. Swaim, therefore,
wrote a lengthy and detailed letter to the Secretary of War recommending this
leniency.' However, it does not appear that this letter was made part of the official
record of the case. In fact, there is no evidence that President Arthur ever saw or
knew of Gen. Swaim's recommendation for leniency. The President confirmed
Lt. Flipper's conviction with only a one-sentence order that includes no statement
that he had given any personal consideration to the record of the case or to the
Judge Advocate's recommendation of leniency."
B.

Lt. Flipper's Subsequent Distinguished Record

After his conviction, Lt. Flipper subsequently led an extraordinarily successful
life both in private industry and in government, primarily in Arizona, New Mexico,
and Washington, D.C. He served the United States with great distinction for 12
years, first as a Special Agent for the Department of Justice attached to the Court
of Private Land Claims, then as a member of the staff of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and lastly as a Special Assistant to the Secretary of the
7
Interior.

3. Trial Iranscript at 464,470,477-478,488,491. Key testimony is reproduced in the Pardon
Petition at 59-61.
4. The charge for which Lt. Flipper was convicted consisted of five specifications, all of
which related to his attempt to wait until he had the funds on hand for which he was responsible.
The first specification was for making a false statement to Colonel Shafter on August 10, 1881,
in connection with transmittal of the funds and representing orally that the funds were in transit
to the Chief Commissary of Subsistence. Specifications two through four concerned the weekly
statements he completed on July 9,16, and 23,1881, that showed the funds in transit to the Chief
Commissary of Subsistence. Specification five involved him displaying a check by which he
attempted to convince Colonel Shafter that the funds were not deficient
5. Attached as Exhibit 1.
6. President Arthur's order is attached as Exhibit 2.
7. When not in federal service, Lt Flipper was a civil engineer, surveyor, and expert in mining
and land laws, practicing in the Southwest Mexico, and South America. He was the first AfricanAmerican to gain distinction in these professions in the United States. See Henry 0. Flipper, Negro
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The U.S. Attorney for the Court of Private Land Claims defended Lt. Flipper's
integrity against a challenge by disappointed litigants before the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1898. In a brief to the Court, the U.S. Attorney wrote that "no
successful attack can be made upon his honesty, his integrity, and his reliability"
and that "[f]ive judges, composing the Court of Private Land Claims, who have
observed him carefully and closely since his original employment, will unite in
commending his work and the integrity of it and the man."' Six years later, the
Attorney General reported to Congress that Lt. Flipper had served the United States
with "fidelity, integrity, and magnificent ability."9 On several occasions, Senator,
and later Secretary ofthe Interior, Albert Fall also attested to Lt. Flipper's excellent
service in the Senate and the Interior Department."
On at least four occasions, Lt. Flipper petitioned Congress to pass a private bill
exonerating him and restoring his rank, but, given the times, was unable to muster
sufficient political support to obtain passage. None of the bills ever reached the
floor of either House. On at least one occasion, he met with the President of the
United States at the White House, in the hopes of securing relief. However,
Lt. Flipper died in Atlanta in 1940 at the age of 84 with his conviction intact.
C.

Posthumous Proceedings in the Army

In 1976, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records conducted
posthumous proceedings in the case of Lt. Flipper. After an exhaustive review of
the record of Lt. Flipper's conviction and post-conviction career, the Board
concluded that Lt. Flipper's conviction and punishment were "unduly harsh, and
therefore unjust." Proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military
Records in the Case of Henr 0. Flipper (Deceased) November 17, 1976,
("ABCMP") at 7" The Board found that Lt. Flipper should not have been
dismissed from service, but ruled that it did not have the authority to overturn the
conviction. Id. at 6. Donald G. Brotzman, Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, expressly "approved" the findings and conclusions
of the Board in a memorandum to the Adjutant General, dated December 13, 1976.
The Adjutant General, Brig. Gen. Robert S. Young, agreed, and on February 8,
1977, the Army corrected Lt Flipper's military records to show that he received an
honorable discharge on June 30, 1882.

Frontiersman: The Western Memoirs of Henry 0. Fliper reproduced in the Pardon Petition
Appendix at Tab A, page vii.
8. See Brief ofthe United States in Opposition to Motion to File Additional Evidence in Faxon
v. United States No. 119, Oct Term 1897 at 9; Pardon Petition at 49-51 and Pardon Petition
Appendix Tab B1.
9. See Annual Report of the Attorney General 1904, at 99; Pardon Petition at 51-52 and
Pardon Petition Appendix at Tab B2.
10. See Letter from Senator Albert B. Fall to Senator James W. Wadsworth, dated Sept 9,
1922; Letter from Senator Albert B. Fall to Senator Harry S. New, dated Sept 9, 1918; Pardon
Petition at 52-58 and Pardon Petition Appendix at Tabs C2 and C4.
11. A complete copy of these proceedings is included as Exhibit 3 and in the Pardon Petition
Appendix at Tabs El, E2 and E3.
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The Army also took other steps to recognize Lt. Flipper's remarkable
accomplishments. In 1977, the Army established the annual Henry 0. Flipper
Award for outstanding cadets at West Point, which has been given every year
thereafter. West Point also dedicated a portion of its library in Lt. Flipper's honor.
In 1978, the Army reburied Lt. Flipper with full military honors.
D.

Other Posthumous Honors

Lt. Flipper has received other posthumous honors as well. The Department of the
Interior granted National Historic Landmark status to a drainage channel engineered
by Lt. Flipper at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, known as "Flipper's Ditch." This channel,
which is still in use today, drained malaria-infested swamps around the fort and has
saved many lives.
The state of Georgia has also honored Lt. Flipper. In 1977, the Governor and the
legislature proclaimed "Henry 0. Flipper Day." In 1989, the state placed a special
commemorative marker at his gravesite in Thomasville, Georgia, in ceremonies
attended by several high state officials.12
E.

The Instant Pardon Petition

:We recognize and deeply appreciate that the Army has done everything within its
power to remedy the injustice done to Lt. Flipper. However, the Army was not the
final reviewing authority that decided that Lt. Flipper should stand convicted of
conduct unbecoming an officer. It was President Arthur, acting as Commander in
Chief, who ultimately rendered that final decision. The actions of the Army in
honoring Lt Flipper, while gratifying, are not the actions of the President, and are
not understood by the public or by the military as constituting the full measure of
recognition and forgiveness that our government ought to bestow on Lt. Flipper.
They are not sufficient to undo the injustice in this case. Accordingly, Lt. Flipper
has now petitioned the President for the grant of a pardon.
Herein we demonstrate that the President-who serves as Commander in Chief
of the Army-clearly has the authority to grant p6sthumous relief to Lt. Flipper by
granting him a pardon. Part I of this submission discusses the fact that Presidential
pardons are granted to remove stigma, to signal forgiveness, and to correct
injustices. Part II demonstrates why the precedent traditionally relied upon by the
Office of the Pardon Attorney does not support the proposition that Lt. Flipper may
not be granted a posthumous pardon. In fact, as is shown in Part III, the President
has the power to grant Lt. Flipper a posthumous pardon. Part IV explains that the
President's power as Commander in Chief of the Army enhances his power to
pardon Lt. Flipper, in order to remedy an unjust conviction and remove its stain
from the military justice system. Part V examines the fact that the President's

12. The Citizens Stamp Advisory Committee of the U.S. Postal Service is considering an
applicalion for a stamp honoring Lt Flipper. The request, which has been pending since 1985, has
garnered the support of broadcasting entrepreneur Ted Turner, former Arizona governor Rose P.
Mofford, and many others. We understand that the request is still "under consideration" at this
time.
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pardon power has been derived from and is coextensive with that of the British
Crown, which has granted posthumous pardons. Part VI shows how state governors,
whose pardon powers may also be traced back to the British Crown, have found no
impediment to granting posthumous pardons. Part VII examines the state and
British experiences and demonstrates why granting Lt. Flipper a pardon will not
result in any subsequent administrative burden to the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
Part VIII establishes that granting Lt. Flipper a posthumous pardon will promote
the public welfare, which is the standard for determining whether a pardon should
be granted.
ARGUMENT
I. PRESIDENTIAL PARDONS ARE GRANTED TO REMOVE STIGMA, TO
SIGNAL FORGIVENESS, AND TO CORRECT INJUSTICES
The "pardon clause," U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, authorizes the President "to
Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment" The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he plain purpose of
the broad power conferred by § 2, cl. 1, was to allow plenary authority in the
President to 'forgive' the convicted person in part or entirely ....
" Schick v.Reed,
419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974). According to the Department of Justice Manual, "[a]
pardon is a symbol of forgiveness of an offender and generally restores basic civil
rights. It is useful in removing stigma incident to conviction and facilitates
restoration of professional and other licenses lost by reason of conviction."
Department of Justice Manual § 1-2.108 at 1-60 (1990-1 Supp.).' 3 It would be
appropriate, therefore, to pardon Lt. Flipper to signal forgiveness.
Presidents have often used the pardon power to heal divisions in our society. As
early as 1795, President Washington issued a broad pardon to help resolve the
Whiskey Rebellion. See Proclamation Granting Pardon to the Western Insurgents,
July 10, 1795.' 4 President Adams issued a pardon to the Pennsylvania Insurgents
on May 21, 1800, expressly noting that they "have returned to a proper sense of
their duty, whereby it is become unnecessary for the public good" to continue
prosecuting the insurgents. See Proclamation Granting Pardon to the Pennsylvania
Insurgents, May 21, 1800. '" Some of the most troubling divisions in our society
today are racial divisions, which have been caused, in part, by institutionalized
discrimination and racial injustice. The conviction of Lt. Flipper resulted from such
discrimination. By pardoning Lt. Flipper, the President will help to heal these racial
divisions.
Presidents have also issued pardons to demonstrate the gratitude of the nation for
those who have provided special services to our country. For example, President
Madison issued a pardon to the Baratarian Pirates of Louisiana who fought in the
defense of New Orleans in 1815, because "the offenders have manifested a sincere

13. Attached as Exhibit 4.
14. See Official Opinions of the Attorneys-General ofthe United States, Vol. 20, at 339-340,
attached as Exhibit 5.
15. Id. at 343.
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penitence" and, by serving the United States against the British, "have exhibited in
the defense of New Orleans unequivocal traits of courage and fidelity." Thus,
President Madison proclaimed, they should be treated "as objects of a generous
forgiveness." See A Proclamation, Feb. 6, 1815.16 This pardon is notable for the
fact that the hope of its receipt induced many pirates, then in federal custody, to risk
their lives in the Battle of New Orleans. It would be unfortunate if President
Madison's forgiveness had been available only to pirates who survived the battle,
but not to those who suffered the supreme sacrifice in the service of their country.
If these pirates could be forgiven their many serious offenses in light of their
subsequent service to the United States in a single battle, so should Lt. Flipper be
forgiven the sole offense of which he was convicted, in light of the fact that he
served the United States thereafter with great distinction over the course of many
years.
Moreover, it is appropriate to use the presidential pardon to correct injustices
within our criminal justice system. See Ex parte Grossman 267 U.S. 87, 120
(1925) ("Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident
mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law."). It would be difficult
to argue with the proposition that an injustice was committed in Lt. Flipper's case,
or that his court-martial has been seen as unjust throughout our nation's history.
Indeed, the highest legal officer responsible for prosecuting Lt. Flipper in the
1800's, the Judge Advocate General, recommended leniency for him.
Subsequently, the ABCMR in the 1970's ruled that Lt. Flipper's conviction was
"unjust." And, at this very moment, the United States Army supports Lt. Flipper's
petition for pardon, reiterating the earlier finding by the ABCMR in the 1970's. 7
Thus, for more than a century, government officials, as well as the public at-large,
have been aware that Lt. Flipper's court-martial was a miscarriage of justice. Such
circumstances are precisely those in which our Constitutional scheme contemplates
that the President will utilize his pardon power. Lee Ex parte Grossman 267 U.S.
at 120.
The fact that Lt. Flipper is not alive to benefit from the restoration of his rights
does not mean that a Presidential pardon is without value, because the stigma of his
conviction endures. For example, the city of El Paso has contemplated creating a
"Walk of History," which would feature larger than life bronze statues of twelve
individuals who helped shape that community. See Thaddeus Herrick, Where Have
All the Heroes Gone? Houston Chron., May 24, 1998 at 1, 1998 WL 3579068.18
The leader of the group appointed by the El Paso City Council to select these
"Twelve Travelers" stated that Lt. Flipper should not be included in this memorial,
inter alia. because he had been "dealt a dishonorable discharge." Id. at 4. This is but
one example of how Lt. Flipper's reputation continues to be unjustifiably
diminished. Various organizations, historians, former West Point graduates, and
members of the military all recognize the stigma that continues to be associated
with Lt. Flipper as a result of his conviction, despite his outstanding service to this

16. Id. at 343-344; 11 Stat. 763-764.
17. See Letter from Jayson L. Spiegel, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs, to the Acting Pardon Attorney, dated May 5, 1998, attached as Exhibit 6.
18. Attached as Exhibit 7.
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country.19 Pardoning Lt. Flipper would show that the President recognizes that the
treatment Lt. Flipper received was unjust and would finally remove the stigma of
this unjust conviction.
II. THE AUTHORITIES RELIED UPON BY THE PARDON ATTORNEY ARE
INAPPOSITE TO LT. FLIPPER'S PARDON PETITION
.TheOffice of the Pardon Attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice relies upon
four cases and one opinion issued by the Office of the Attorney General as support
for the proposition that the President cannot grant posthumous pardon requests.
These authorities are Burdick v. United States 236 U.S. 79 (1915); United
States v.Wilson. 32 U.S. 150, 7 Pet. 150 (1833); Sierra v. United States. 9 Ct. C1.
224, 1800 WL 773 (1873); Meldrim v. United States 7 Ct. Cl. 595, 1800 WL 1602
(1871); and Caldwell's Case, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 35, 1864 WL 1458 (1864).
However, none of these authorities presents a situation wherein the President
intended to grant a pardon to a person known to be deceased. For this, and for other
reasons, these authorities-all but one of which are more than a century old-are
easily distinguishable from the instant matter. Moreover, to the extent these cases
stand for the proposition that a pardon, like a deed, must be "accepted" before it
becomes effective, these authorities are no longer good law.
A.

The Pardon Attorney's Supreme Court Jurisprudence

The Pardon Attorney's concern that a pardon may not be issued posthumously
appears to stem from the fact that if a grantee is no longer alive, she cannot accept
her pardon. The notion that a pardon must be accepted by the grantee in order to be
effected emerged from a statement by the Supreme Court in the early case of United
States v. Wilson 32 U.S. 150 (1833):
A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which, delivery is essential, and delivery is
not complete without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom
it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to
force it on him.
Id. at 161.
In Wilson the defendant had pled not guilty to a number of indictments dealing
with obstructing the mail, robbing the mail, and putting the life of a mail carrier in
jeopardy. He subsequently went to trial on one of the indictments, was convicted of
the robbery and endangerment charges therein, and was sentenced to death.
Thereafter, Mr. Wilson withdrew his not guilty pleas to the remaining indictments
pending against him, and entered guilty pleas as to them. President Jackson
subsequently pardoned Mr. Wilson only for "the crime for which he has been
sentenced to suffer death." Id. at 153. The terms of the pardon specifically stated

19. See, e.g., Letter from Franklin J. Henderson, Colonel and Immediate Past National
President, Ninth & Tenth (Horse) Cavalry Association, dated June 19,1998; Letter from James
M. McPherson, George Henry Davis Professor of History, Princeton University to President
Clinton, dated June 5, 1998, attached as Exhibits 8 and 9.
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that it did not apply to any other judgment that might be had or obtained against him
in any other case or cases then pending before the court. Id. Thereafter, the trial
court was interested in inquiring as to the effect of the pardon because it had been
granted as to an offense which, by the terms of the various indictments, was alleged
to be related to the ones for which Mr. Wilson was about to be sentenced.
However, Mr. Wilson explicitly declined to avail himself of any advantage or
protection the pardon might have given him before the court, and refused to invoke
the pardon in any way. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that a pardon that was
not "brought judicially before the court, by plea, motion or otherwise, ought not to
be noticed by the judges, or in any manner to affect the judgment at law." Id. at 163.
Relying on Wilson the Supreme Court held in another early case that a person
may refuse a full and unconditional pardon that was given to him for the express
purpose of removing his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and
compelling his testimony before a grand jury. Burdick v. United States 236 U.S.
79 (1915). Mr. Burdick was the city editor of the New York Tribune, and was
called to testify before a Federal grand jury about his knowledge of various custom
frauds being investigated. Id. Mr. Burdick refused to testify on the ground that he
might incriminate himself and was found in contempt. Id. Therefore, President
Woodrow Wilson, siia sponte issued Mr. Burdick a full and unconditional pardon,
in an effort to compel his testimony.2" The Court emphasized that Mr. Burdick was
free to refuse the President's pardon and decline to testify before the grand jury
because, inter alia given the fact that he had never been charged with or convicted
of a crime, Mr. Burdick may have deemed that accepting the pardon would involve
"consequences of even greater disgrace than those from which it purports to
relieve." Id. at 90.
Burdick and Wilson are easily distinguishable from the instant matter. Allowing
the pardon to be refused in Burdick is premised upon protecting the "right of the
individual against the exercise of executive power not solicited by him nor accepted
by him." 236 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added). This is also the rationale in the Wilson
decision, wherein Mr. Wilson deliberately chose to not assert the pardon as a
defense at his sentencing, or bring it before the court in any way. The circumstances
in those cases are very different from the instant matter. Unlike Messrs. Burdick
and Wilson, Lt. Flipper actively and repeatedly solicited assistance to clear his
name and remove the stigma of his unjust conviction. Toward that end, he solicited
Congress several times during his life to have his conviction set aside. See Letter
from Senator Albert B. Fall to Senator James W. Wadsworth of September 9, 1922
(discussing one such bill); Letter from Senator Albert B. Fall to Senator Harry S.

20. The pardon in Burdick stated, in pertinent part
Whereas, the United States attorney for the southern district of New York desires to
use the said George Burdick as a witness before the said grand jury ... and,
Whereas, it is believed that the said George Burdick will again refuse to testify in the
said proceeding on the ground that his testimony might tend to incriminate himself;
Now, therefore, be it known, that I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States
ofAmerica ... hereby grant unto the said George Burdick a full and unconditional
pardon ....
236 U.S. at 85-86.
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New of September 9, 1918 (same). 2' Lt. Flipper's western memoirs also describe
his "bitter disappointment" over the fact that proposed legislation to clear his name
was never reported out of committee and never reached a vote. See Henry 0.
Flipper, Negro Frontiersman: The Western Memoirs of Henry Q, Flipper at 37-39
(1963).22

Lt. Flipper even sought the President's aid in removing the stigma from his name.
He paid a friend who was the Registrar of the Treasury to set up a meeting with
President McKinley to talk about his court-martial, but like his other efforts, this
failed. Id. at 38. Lt. Flipper's "friend" took his money, and Lt. Flipper ended up in
a receiving line at the White House with fifteen or twenty others. As Lt. Flipper
describes the incident: "[tihe whole thing did not last two minutes and no one spoke
a word except the President." Id. In his memoirs, Lt. Flipper wrote about his failed
attempts to clear his name:
I have worked hard at all times to have my Army record cleared but I have never
had any illusions and have none now. It is uphill work.
Id. at 39. Given his efforts in this regard, it is abundantly clear that Lt. Flipper has
constructively solicited a pardon, and that were he alive today, he would both solicit
and accept a Presidential pardon. His descendants formally do so today on his
behalf.Y
Burdick is also distinguishable in several other significant respects. First, it
should be noted that the issue in Burdick would not arise today. At the time Burdick
was decided, the immunity given to witnesses in federal cases was transactional
immunity. See Brown v. Walker 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (upholding 27 Stat. 443
adopted in 1893 by Congress and providing transactional immunity). However, in
1970, Congress amended the federal statute to provide for use immunity. See 18
U.S.C. § 6002 et seg. (1994); see also Kastigar v. United States 406 U.S. 441
(1972) (upholding the grant of use immunity provided under 18 U.S.C. § 6002).
Therefore, in modern times, there would be no need for a President to attempt to
force a pardon upon a person who had not been convicted of a crime, merely to
procure his testimony before a federal grand jury.

21. Copies of these letters are attached as Exhibits 10 and 11 and were also included as
character references in Lt. Flipper's Petition for Pardon at 54 and in the Appendix to that Petition
at Tabs C2 and C4.
22. Attached as Exhibit 12. The full text of these memoirs is included in the Appendix to
Lt Flipper's Petition for Pardon at Tab A.
23. Even ifone were to take the words of Wilson literally and approach a pardon as if it were
a deed, there would be no impediment to issuing a pardon to Lt Flipper. A deed traditionally is a
conveyance ofrealty. See Black's Law Dictionary 414 (6th ed. 1990). Since Lt Flipper has died,
his heirs, who have made this pardon application on his behalf, can accept any property
posthumously deeded to him. Lt Flipper's estate would be administered in Georgia. Under Georgia
Law, an estate may be reopened after it is settled for the purpose of administering additional
property. See Ga. CodeAnn. § 53-7-50(d) (1997). If a person dies intestate, his heirs may petition
the court for an order that no administration is necessary if the heirs agree to a division of the
property. See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 53-2-40 through 53-2-42 (1997). Therefore, even if a pardon
were really a deed, one may be granted to a Georgia decedent Lt Flipper's heirs would be happy
to reopen his estate orto go to courtto obtain the order that no administration was necessary, if that
is what now is required to clear his name.
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Moreover, before he was ever tried or convicted of anything, Mr. Burdick was
offered a pardon that he did not request. He rejected the pardon, at least in part,
because he believed that it might not provide sufficient immunity. Id. at 87. This
situation is not applicable to Lt. Flipper. Lt. Flipper already has been tried and
convicted. Thus, his case raises none of the same concerns about self-incrimination
or the sufficiency of the immunity given by the pardon.
Finally, the Court also allowed Mr. Burdick to reject the pardon because, given
the circumstances, he might have viewed accepting it as a badge of dishonor or an
admission of wrongdoing. The Court recognized that Mr. Burdick might feel that
others in his community would question why the President would issue a pardon to
a person who had not been charged with or convicted of a crime. By contrast,
Lt. Flipper already has been convicted. Thus, unlike Mr. Burdick, a pardon for
Lt. Flipper will serve to alleviate the disgrace of his conviction, rather than to bring
further disrepute upon him.
B.

The Pardon Attorney's Court of Federal Claims Cases

*The Office of the Pardon Attorney also points to two cases brought shortly after
the Civil War in the Court of Federal Claims, in which the administrators of
decedents' estates were attempting to collect money judgments against the United
States. Neither case deals with the President's ability to grant intentionally a
posthumous pardon.
In Meldri v. United States. 7 Ct. Cl. 595 (1871), the plaintiff, Margaret Doyle,
administratrix of her husband's estate, sued under a federal statute to recover for
thirty-one bales of cotton that she claimed had been captured in 1865 by the
government. The statute under which the case was brought, the Act of March 12',
1863, required that, in order to recover, the administratrix had to prove, inter alia
that her deceased husband never gave any aid or comfort to the rebellion. Id. at 596.
There was little or no evidence of Mr. Doyle's loyalty to the Union. Mr. Doyle
could have established his loyalty during his lifetime either by taking an oath of
loyalty to the United States or by obtaining a special pardon. He had applied to the
President for a special pardon, which subsequently was granted. However,
Mr. Doyle died nine days after its issuance without having accepted it. Id.
Mr. Doyle had not taken the oath of amnesty before his death, pursuant to which he
also could have proven his loyalty. The court held that had Mr. Doyle either
accepted his pardon or taken the oath of amnesty before his death, Mrs. Doyle could
have recovered for the cotton. Id. at 597. However, because he did neither, there
was a failure of proof as to his loyalty. Therefore, recovery was barred under the
applicable statute.
The Court discussed the limited role that pardons and amnesty play in this
particular type of post-Civil War case involving claims against the government:
The most, in this class of cases, that is claimed for pardon or amnesty, whether
granted directly by the -warrant of the President or proclaimed in his
proclamations, is, that it purges the offender of the crime that previously stood
in the way of his prosecuting a suit in this court, and thereby restores to him all
the rights and privileges which he would have enjoyed if he had never offended
against the Constitution and laws of the United States. In other words, pardon
or amnesty ... comes in the place of proof of loyalty, and thereby answers the
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requirements of the statute. But it does not supercede or set the statute aside. It
remains in full force, and we are bound to give it effect.
Id. The court went on to state that, under such circumstances, plaintiffadministratrix could not cure the situation by claiming that her deceased husband's
loyalty could be proven by way of the President's subsequent Proclamation of
December 1868, which was issued after he died. That Proclamation granted general
amnesty and unconditional pardons to all who were involved in the rebellion. The
court said that it could not allow plaintiff-administratrix to utilize that Proclamation
to bring her lawsuit, because doing so would violate both well-established
principles of the capacity of personal representatives to bring suit, as well as the
provisions of the statute under which the case was brought:
In this view of the case it seems to follow, logically, that we cannot by any
sort of legal imputation hold that the President's proclamation of the 2 5'
December, 1868, granting amnesty and pardon unconditionally to all, can in any
way affect the legal status of Doyle while he lived. To hold otherwise would be
to revive the riaht of action in the personal representative, lost by the default and
neglect of her intestate- and, at the same time, wholly to disregard the plain
provisions of the third section of the Act March 12, 1863 [which provided that
claimants prove that they never gave aid or comfort to the rebellion].
Id. at 597-98 (emphasis added).
Likewise, two years later, the Court of Federal Claims denied relief, for failure
to meet the statute of limitations, to another administratrix in Florida. She claimed
that her deceased husband was owed more than $3,700 by the government. Sierra v.
United States 9 Ct. Cl. 224 (1873).
In Sierra the husband of the claimant-administratrix had been the collector of
customs at the port of Pensacola, Florida. When the Civil War began in 1861, he
ceased to act on behalf of United States, and gave aid and comfort to the rebellion.
In May, 1865, the President issued a Proclamation granting amnesty and pardon to
all who had participated in the rebellion, on the sole condition that they take and
keep an oath to faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States and the union of the States, and to uphold the laws and cease to be a rebel
against the United States. Although the Proclamation was in effect for two years
before he died, Mr. Sierra never sought to take the oath and thereby avail himself
of the amnesty the Proclamation provided. Because he did not do so, the suit
brought by his administratrix was barred. In so ruling, the court stated:
From the date of that proclamation to the day of his death, nearly two years
afterward, the door of amnesty stood wide open to Joseph Sierra, and he would
not avail himself of the opportunity to remove the only barrier to his recourse
here. Had he sought the benefit of that proffered amnesty, he might at any time
thereafter have filed his petition here ....
Id. at 232.
Plaintiff-administratrix also attempted to claim that, having failed to fulfill the
conditions of the May 1865 Proclamation available to him during his life, her
deceased husband nevertheless could avail himself of a subsequent Proclamation,
issued in December 1868, one year after his death. That Proclamation offered
general amnesty, and administratrix claimed that it cleansed her deceased husband
p
the court ruled that the Proclamation of 1868
of his treason. Citing Meldrr
was inoperative as to one who had died before its issue. Id. at 233.
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Meldrim and Sierra significantly differ from the instant matter. Messrs. Doyle and
Sierra actually had the opportunity to obtain pardons, or in the alternative, to
otherwise demonstrate their loyalty to the United States during their lifetimes, and
thereby meet the requirements of the statute under which their lawsuits were filed.
As the Sierra court noted, "the... disqualification to sue here was the result of his
[Mr. Sierra's] own omission" in not availing himself of the President's pardon. Id.
The same can be said of Mr. Doyleregarding his failure to take a readily available
oath of loyalty to the United States. By contrast, despite his repeated efforts to clear
his name, Lt. Flipper never had a pardon extended to him.
C.

The Attorney General Opinion Cited by the Pardon Attorney

Finally, the Office of the Pardon Attorney relies upon an Opinion of the Attorney
General dating back to 1864. Caldwell's Case, 11 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 35, 1864
WL 1458 (1864). That Attorney General Opinion, however, did not deal with the
issue of a posthumous pardon. Rather, the issue presented was whether the
President had the power to remit posthumously a fine that had been imposed as part
of the punishment for a conviction. Id. In deciding that the posthumous remission
was within the President's power, the Attorney General merely cited Wilson and
stated in dicta that it "might be doubtful" if the President could grant a deed of
pardon to a man after his death. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). The Attorney General,
however, was not addressing-and, indeed, has never squarely addressed-the
propriety of a posthumous Presidential pardon.
In fact, the Office of the Legal Counsel stated in 1977 that the question of
whether the President may issue a pardon posthumously "has never been resolved
judicially." Presidential Authority - Slovik Case 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 370,
373 (1977). Indeed, the Office of Legal Counsel stated that its own research
"indicates that there are conflicting internal departmental memoranda on this
question and that none can be said to resolve the question definitively." Id. at n.7.
III.

THE PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO PARDON LT. FLIPPER

A. The Public Welfare, Rather Than Acceptance of the Pardon, Is the Touchstone
of the President's Power To Issue Pardons
More recent cases than those cited by the Pardon Attorney make it clear that there
is no requirement that a pardon must be accepted by the grantee in order to be
effectuated. In fact, in a much more recent case discussing the development of the
presidential pardon power, the Supreme Court has stated that "the requirement of
consent was a legal fiction at best." Schick v.Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 261 (1974). In
addition, the Supreme Court subsequently has made it clear that the "acceptance"
requirement of Burdick is not to be extended to all cases relating to the President's
pardon power. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).24

24. See also Hemoel v. Weedim 23 F.2d 949,951 (W.D. Wash. 1928) ("In Burdick v. United
States it was held that the acceptance of a pardon was essential to its Validity, but it has been held
this is not true in all cases.") (citing Perovih.
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In Perovih, the Court allowed President Taft's commutation of a prisoner's
sentence from hanging to life imprisonment without the prisoner's consent. The
Court elaborated on the general principles relating to pardons, stating that:
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening
to possess power. It is a part ofthe Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the
determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better
served by inflicting less than what the iudgment fixed. Just as the original
punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in
the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his
consent determines what shall be done.
Id. at 486 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that the
public welfare-not the consent of the grantee-is the touchstone for the
President's power to issue pardons. The Perovich Court further held that the
President did not need Perovich's consent to commute his sentence because there
was a "common understanding" that imprisonment for life is a lesser penalty than
death. 274 U.S. at 487.
The "public welfare" test also has been recognized in a more recent Opinion of
the Attorney General. See Pardoning Power of the President 41 Op. Att'y
Gen. 251, 258-59 (1955). That Opinion discusses the propriety of conditionally
commuting a death sentence, and cites Perovich for the proposition that "'the public
welfare, not his [the prisoner's] consent, determines what shall be done."'
Although there is no way now to lessen the actual punishment that Lt. Flipper
received, public welfare concerns nevertheless dictate that he should be pardoned,
since doing so would remove the stigma of a long-standing unjust conviction from
Lt. Flipper's reputation, as well as from the military justice system.
Moreover, it is of no consequence that Lt. Flipper is not alive to accept his
pardon. If acceptance was not needed in Perovich to commute the sentence of an
individual who did not want the commutation, there should be no acceptance
requirement here-especially when it is so clear that Lt. Flipper desired a pardon.
In addition, by contrast to the earlier case of Burdick v. United States sUra
Mr. Perovich already had been convicted and sentenced. Thus, the Court ruled that
he had no right to determine how he would be punished. He could not insist upon
execution. See Perovich 274 U.S. at 487. The Court, therefore, held that
Perovich's consent was not needed to commute his sentence. 274 U.S. 480. Like
Mr. Perovich, Lt. Flipper need not consent to or accept his pardon in order for it to
be effective. He already has been convicted.
In sum, the decision to pardon Lt. Flipper should be based on what the President
deems will best serve the public welfare. The public welfare clearly will be well
served by granting a pardon to remove the stigma of a conviction that even
government officials have acknowledged was unjust for more than a century.
B.

No Limitation on Granting Posthumous Pardons Appears in the Constitution

The Supreme Court has held "that the pardoning power is an enumerated power
of the Constitution and that its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution
itself." Schick 419 U.S. at 267. There are only three limitations on the use of the
Presidential pardon power specified in the Constitution. First, offenses leading to
impeachment are explicitly excluded. Second, the act being pardoned must be an
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offense against the United States. "This clause precludes the President from
pardoning offenses against the individual states and from intervening in civil suits.
The former limitation is based upon the American federal system; the latter upon
accepted historical limitation." William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon:
A Constitutional History 18 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 475, 525-26 (1977). And there
is a further requirement that the act being pardoned must already have occurred.
This prevents the President from granting a pardon in advance of the act, and
perhaps thereby encouraging an unlawful action. Therefore, the President retains
a great deal of discretion in the exercise of his pardon power. "Alone among the
powers enumerated in the Constitution, the power to pardon proceeds unfettered."
Duker, supra at 535.
Chief Justice Taft reasoned that the possibility that the pardoning power could
be perverted so as to destroy the deterrent effect ofjudicial punishment is not a
sufficient basis for limiting the President's discretion to grant clemency. 'Our
Constitution,' wrote Taft for a unanimous Court, 'confers [full] discretion [to
pardon] on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse
it.'
Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the Pardoning Power
from the King 69 Tex. L. Rev. 569, 597 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
The presidential pardon power, therefore, is very broad. See Ex parte Garland.
71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) ("The [pardon] power thus conferred is unlimited, with
the exception [for impeachment] stated."). The President is answerable only
politically should he abuse this power. The instant pardon petition does not fall into
one of the areas in which the granting of pardons is proscribed by the Constitution,
and thus, it may be granted.
The Pardon Attorney may be concerned because a posthumous Presidential
pardon has never before been intentionally granted. 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at
372. Assuming, arguendo that this is correct, it is not dispositive. In the United
States, it was once argued that a conditional Presidential pardon was
unconstitutional. However, the President's power to grant such a pardon was
upheld by the Supreme Court, despite protests from the dissent that such a pardon
had never before been granted by the President. See Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307
(1855). The fact that it had not been done before did not matter; what mattered was
that the Constitution did not prohibit it. "The very essence of the pardoning power
is to treat each case individually." Schick 419 U.S. at 265. Accordingly, because
there is no constitutional limitation on issuing posthumous pardons, Lt. Flipper's
petition should be considered on its merits.
IV. AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, THE PRESIDENT HAS A SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITY TO GRANT THE INSTANT PARDON TO ENSURE THE
INTEGRITY OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
The Commander in Chief clause, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, provides further
constitutional impetus for the President to grant the posthumous pardon requested
here. That clause states that "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army."
Pursuant to this clause, the President has a special responsibility to ensure the
good order and discipline of the United States Armed Forces. A fair and impartial
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military justice system is essential to that purpose. The ability of the military justice
system to contribute to the good order and discipline of the Armed Forces is
threatened when an unjust conviction goes uncorrected, because soldiers of all
colors, as well as the public at-large, will lose confidence in that system if they
perceive it to be tainted by bias or favoritism.
As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he President's duties as Commander in
Chief... require him to take responsible and continuing action to superintend the
military, including courts-martial." Loving v. United States 517 U.S. 748, 772
(1996).
The Court added:
"The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian," Oloff v. Willoughbv 345 U.S. 83, 94
(1953), and the President can be entrusted to determine what limitations and
conditions on punishments are best suited to preserve that special discipline.
Loving 517 U.S. at 773.
Loving did not address the President's power to issue pardons; rather, it dealt
with the President's power to prescribe certain aggravating circumstances upon
which courts-martial may impose the death penalty. However, the case is important
here because it recognizes that the President is required by the Commander in Chief
Clause to exercise "continuing" supervision over military justice in order to
preserve the "special discipline" of the military community. Loving indicates that
implicit in this power should be the power to pronounce, at any time, official
forgiveness of military offenses if, in the President's judgment, forgiveness is
appropriate to preserve the special discipline governing the military.
The offense for which Lt. Flipper seeks pardon-conduct unbecoming an
officer-is defined in the Articles of War. It is purely a military offense and has no
civilian counterpart. The military justice procedures in effect in the 191 centuryunlike civilian, or even modem military proceedings---did not permit judicial
review of Lt. Flipper's conviction. Proceedings in his case were confined entirely
to the Army and its civilian Executive Branch supervisors, beginning with the
court-martial itself, up through review by President Arthur acting in his capacity as
Commander in Chief. Under such circumstances, the President has a special
responsibility in his role as Commander in Chief to utilize his pardon power to
remove from the record of the military justice system the stain of this unjust
conviction.
V. THE PRESIDENT'S PARDON POWER IS COEXTENSIVE WITH THAT
OF THE BRITISH CROWN, WHICH HAS GRANTED POSTHUMOUS
PARDONS
A.

The President's Pardon Power is Coextensive with the British Crown

According to the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of
Justice, "[t]he pardon clause of the Constitution was derived from the pardon power
held by the King of England at the adoption of the Constitution." See Effects of a
Presidential Pardon 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel ____, 1995 WL 861618 (June 19,
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1995). The Justice Department's position is based upon Supreme Court precedent.
See. g., Schick 419 U.S. at 262-63:
In short, by 1787 [the year of adoption of the Constitution], the English
prerogative to pardon was unfettered except for a few specifically enumerated
limitations. The history of our executive pardoning power reveals a consistent
pattern of adherence to the English common-law practice.
Hamilton's Federalist No. 69 summarized the proposed section 2 powers,
including the power to pardon, as "resembl(ing) equally that of the King of Great
Britain and the Governor of New-York." (emphasis added).
The court added that "the draftsmen [of the Constitution] were well acquainted with
the English Crown authority to alter and reduce punishments as it existed in 1787,"
Id. at 260, and that "the draftsmen of Art II, section 2, spoke in terms of a
'prerogative' of the President, which ought not be 'fettered or embarrassed."' Id.
at 263.
In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, "we adopt [British Crown]
principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon." Wilson 32 U.S. at 160.
See also Ex parte Grossman 267 U.S. at 108-09 ("The language of the Constitution
cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British
institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted."). Speaking
specifically to the pardoning power, Chief Justice Taft observed that "the power of
the king under the British Constitution, [] plainly was the prototype of this clause."
Id. at 118. "Hence, when the words 'to grant pardons' were used in the
Constitution, they connoted the authority as exercised by the English crown or by
its representatives in the colonies." Duker, sura at 508.
B.

Posthumous Pardons Granted by the British Crown

There is no doubt that in 1787 the British Crown had the power to issue pardons,
and there is no suggestion that at any time since then there has been an expansion
of the Crown's pardon power. See Schick v.Reed 419 U.S. at 262 ("In short, by
1787 the English prerogative to pardon was unfettered except for a few specially
enumerated limitations."). The power given to the President in the U.S. Constitution
to issue pardons can be directly traced to the pardon power vested in the British
Crown, which has, in fact, issued posthumous pardons.
In the British case of Regina v. Timothy John Evans, defendant Evans was
convicted of murder and executed in 1950. However, in the mid-1960s, the
Secretary of State for the Home Department (the official vested with the de facto
power to grant Crown pardons under British constitutional practice) determined
that Evans had been innocent of the crime. Accordingly, on October 18, 1966,
pursuant to the Home Secretary's advice, Queen Elizabeth II issued a posthumous
"free pardon" to Evans, exonerating him of guilt and declaring his innocence. See
734 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) at 38-40 (1966).25
In the British case of Regina v. Derek Bentley defendant Bentley was convicted
of murder and executed in 1953. In 1992, in response to efforts by Bentley's sister

25. Attached as Exhibit 13.
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to obtain a posthumous pardon, the Home Secretary refused, stating that, on review
of the trial record, he did not believe a pardon was appropriate. However, on July 7,
1993, the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, in a unanimous three-justice
decision, recommended that the Home Secretary reverse the decision and issue a
conditional posthumous pardon, finding that Bentley should not have been executed.
See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Bentley [1994] QB
349, [1993] 4 All ER 442 DC.2" In this case, the court noted that:
There has been only one posthumous free pardon in modem times. That was
granted to Timothy Evans in 1966. A free pardon was granted in that case
because ...
the Home Secretary of the day considered the conviction itself to be
wrong.
Id. at 448. The court rejected Bentley's request for an unconditional "free"
pardon," but the court noted that the Home Secretary had failed to consider the
possibility of granting a conditional pardon reducing Bentley's sentence to life
*imprisonment. In ruling that the Home Secretary could indeed grant such a
posthumous conditional pardon, the court held that:
there is no objection to the grant of a posthumous conditional pardon ....The
grant of such a pardon is a recognition by the state that a mistake was made and
that a reprieve should have been granted.
Id. at 455. On July 29, 1993, in response to the High Court ruling, the Home
Secretary approved and the Queen granted "Our Pardon in respect of the said
sentence [of death]. " 2s
In 1996, the definitive treatise on English law, Halsbury's Laws of England,
stated it plainly: "A pardon may be granted posthumously." Halsburv's 4th ed.
Reissue 1996, Vol. 8(2), 823, at 482 (citing ex parte Bentley. supra."
The British legal officials who advised the Home Secretary in 1966 to pardon
Evans posthumously would not have recommended that course of action had they
not first assured themselves that the Crown had the power to issue such pardons.
Moreover, had there been any serious doubt concerning the Crown's ability to grant
posthumous pardons, the discussion of the Evans pardon in the House of Commons
most certainly would have reflected it. But that discussion, as reported, reveals that
no member of Parliament had such a concern.3 Likewise, it is inconceivable that
the Queen's Bench Division, in its unanimous decision in ex parte Bentley would
have omitted any discussion of whether it was lawful to issue posthumous pardons

26. Attached as Exhibit 14.
27. The Crown's policy in issuing 'Tree" pardons had been to grant such pardons, whether
posthumous or not, only in cases where the convicted person was found to have been "morally and
technically innocent' of the crime. The British court in the Bentle case accepted the Home
Secretary's finding that Bentley failed this standard. Id. at 454. This unwillingness to grant an
unconditional pardon without finding that the grantee was innocent is not relevant to the scope of
the pardon power, but is a distinction in policy. In contrast to the Crown's policy, the U.S.
Department of Justice Manual says that "in all clemency cases, the guilt of the petitioner is
assumed, and the question of guilt or innocence is not relitigated in clemency proceedings."
Department of Justice Manual § 1-2.108 at 1-57 (1990-1 Supp.), attached as Exhibit 4.
28. A copy of this posthumous pardon is attached as Exhibit 15.
29. Attached as Exhibit 16.
30. Attached as Exhibit 13.
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had there been any question concerning the issue." The decision reflects no such
discussion. The legality of issuance of a posthumous pardon was clear to all justices
of the court.
Accordingly, the Pardon Attorney should follow Supreme Court precedent and
Department of Justice policy (as announced by the Office of Legal Counsel in
1995), and adopt the principles of the British Crown relating to the pardon power.
The Crown clearly has concluded that it has the power to issue posthumous
pardons. The Pardon Attorney ought to adhere to this practice and acknowledge that
the President also may issue posthumous pardons.
VI. THE PRESIDENT'S PARDON POWER IS SILAR TO THAT OF STATE
GOVERNORS, WHO HAVE GRANTED POSTHUMOUS PARDONS
A. The Original Source of the Governors' Pardon Powers is the Same as that of
the President's
Like the President's pardon power, the power vested in the governors of states
that had been British colonies reaches back to the Crown's pardon power. The
English royal model influenced the colonies during the pre-Revolutionary period.
When America was colonized, the king in most instances delegated the
pardoning power to his counterpart and direct representative in the New World,
the royal governor. The colonial charters of Virginia, Massachusetts Bay,
Maryland, Maine, the Carolinas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia
committed the clemency power to the executive.

Kobil, Wr at 589; see also Duker, p at475 (1977) (tracing the history of the
pardon power and coming to the same conclusions). This model was carried
forward as the states passed their own constitutions, although several states
attempted to restrict this executive power:
During the pre-Independence period there were three models for the institution
of clemency: (a) vesting the power in the governor, (b) vesting the power in the
governor acting only with the consent of the Executive Council; (c) vesting the
power in the legislature. During the period 1790-1860 there was a revival in
public trust of the executive, and twenty-one states adopted model (a), while four
preferred model (b). Since 1890, in keeping with the increasing
professionalization of the pardoning power, the majority of state constitutions
have provided for some sort of autonomous board of pardons having either
formal decision-making power or at least an advisory role in this respect.

Leslie Sebba, The Pardoning Power-A World Survey 68 J. Crini. L. &
Criminology 83, 112 (1977). Although the pardon power in some state constitutions
is more restrictive than the President's,3 2 the pardon power in the federal
Constitution exerted an influence on the states:

31. Attached as Exhibit 14.
32. For example, some states include additional offenses beyond impeachment in their
constitutional prohibition on pardons. Other states require the governor to act in conjunction with
the state legislature or an advisory board in issuing pardons. See Section V.B., infra.
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The development of state constitutions and, presumably, the influence of the
newly adopted federal constitution led to the abolition of the legislative council
and an increase in the governor's clemency powers in a number of states. The
idea that the executive branch was the proper repository of the clemency power
rapidly gained popularity, and most of the new states admitted to the Union
allocated the power to the governor alone.
Kobil, sWra at 605 (footnotes omitted). The fact that some of these states have
issued pardons posthumously bolsters the conclusion that this is an appropriate use
of the pardon power that resides today with the President.
B.

Posthumous Pardons Granted by State Governors

Nine states have granted posthumous pardons on at least ten separate occasions
since 1977. Although the constitutional language of the pardon clauses from these
states varies, the pardon power in these state constitutions is at least as expansive
as the broad authority given to the President in article II, § 2, cl. 1. Therefore, the
experience of these states is compelling.
The manner in which the pardon power is exercised in these nine states can be
grouped into four categories. In Maryland, California, and Arizona, the governor
has the exclusive authority to bestow pardons. In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
Oklahoma, the recommendation of an advisory board is required for the governor
to issue a pardon. In Nebraska and Nevada, the pardon power is vested in a
decision-making body that includes the chief executive of the state. Finally in
Georgia, the State Board of Pardon and Paroles has the authority to issue pardons.
Regardless of these formulations, none of these states saw any impediment to the
granting of posthumous pardons.
1.

Governor as Exclusive Grantor

a.

Maland

Of the states that have conferred posthumous pardons, the State of Maryland vests
authority in the governor, byway of its constitution, in language very similar to that
of the federal Constitution. It gives the governor of Maryland discretion to grant
pardons, except in cases of impeachment.33 Unlike the President, however,
Maryland's governor has significant procedural mechanisms imposed upon him.
The governor must give public notice of pardon applications that are under his

33. See Md. Const art IL § 20, which states:
He shall have powerto grantreprieves and pardons, except in cases of impeachment,
and in cases, in which he is prohibited by other Articles of this Constitution; and to
remit fines and forfeitures for offences against the State; but shall not remit the
principal or interest of any debt due the State, except, in eases of fines and
forfeitures; and before granting a nolle prosequi, or pardon, he shall give notice, in
one or more newspapers, of the application made for it, and of the day on, or after
which, his decision will be given; and in every case, in which he exercises this

power, he shall report to either Branch of the Legislature, whenever required, the
petitions, recommendations and reasons, which influenced his decision.
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consideration and notify the state legislature regarding the petitions,
recommendations and reasons that informed his decision. This notice requirement
does not, however, serve as a restriction on the governor's authority, but merely as
an avenue of accountability.
Maryland Governor William Donald Schaefer posthumously pardoned Jerome S.
Cardin in 1994. Cardin was convicted in 1986 of stealing $3 85,000 from Old Court
Savings and Loan, of which he was a co-owner.34 He was sentenced to a 15-year
prison term, but was released due to failing health after serving a little more than
a year in prison. Prior to his conviction, he had been a prominent civic activist and
philanthropist, founding both the Retinitis Pigmentosa Foundation and the Basic
Cancer Research Foundation in Baltimore. The governor's office cited Cardins
lifetime of philanthropic service, time served in prison, and payment of $10 million
in restitution as grounds for the posthumous pardon.35 According to the pardon
certificate, Governor Schaefer granted a full posthumous pardon, "absolving him
[Cardin] from the guilt of his criminal offenses and exempting him from any pains
and penalties imposed upon him therefore by law."36
b.

California

.The California constitution also vests the pardon power exclusively in its
governor.3 7 The governor may grant pardons to offenders after they have been
sentenced, except in cases of impeachment and subject to application procedures
provided by statute.38 Akin to Maryland's arrangement, the governor of California
is required to give notice to the state legislature, including reasons for bestowing
the pardon.
On April 15, 1996, Governor Pete Wilson posthumously pardoned Jack Ryan,
who had served almost 25 years in prison after being wrongly convicted for murder
by a corrupt district attorney. Originally, a jury acquitted Ryan, but a year later, a

34. See Cardin v. State, 533 A.2d 928 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1987), apeal denied 538 A.2d
777 (Md. 1988); see also John W. Frece, Schaefer Grants Cardin Pardon in S & L Scandal,
Baltimore Sun, Sept 10, 1994, at Al, attached as Exhibit 17.
35. See id. See enerallvAlec MatthewKlein, S & L Meltdown, Baltimore Sun, May 7, 1995,
atEl; Thomas W. Waldron, Commuted Term was Typical of Schaefer As Governor, He Relied
on Inslincts, Advice ofLongtime Friend Baltimore Sun, Oct 4,1997, atBI, attached as Exhibits
18 and 19.
36. Pardon Proclamation (for Jerome S. Cardin), Md. Exec. Dep't (Sept 2,1994), attached
as Exhibit 20.
37. See Cal. Const art. V, § 8(a), which states:
Subject to application procedures provided by statute, the Governor, on conditions
the Governor deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after
sentence, except in case of impeachment The Governor shall report to the
Legislature each reprieve, pardon, and commutation granted, stating the pertinent
facts and the reasons for granting it The Governor may not grant a pardon or
commutation to a person twice convicted of a felony except on recommendation of
the Supreme Court, 4 judges concurring.
38. The only other constitutional limitation on the California governor is that he may not
pardon an individual who has been twice convicted of a felony except on the recommendation of
at least four judges of the state Supreme Court
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bootlegger was elected district attorney. Unable to gain a confession to two highly
publicized murders by other means, the district attorney secretly paid a woman
$100 to swear in a complaint that Ryan had raped her daughter. 9 After Ryan's
arrest, two other women made similar accusations. After two months in jail, Ryan
confessed to two of the rapes, and following a night of interrogation, confessed to
the murders as well. He was sentenced to life in prison on September of 1928.
Ryan served nearly 25 years in prison before being paroled in 1953.40 He did not
leave behind any surviving relatives who petitioned on his behalf. Instead, a district
attorney's investigator spent more than ten years working to clear Ryan's name
4
after one of Ryan's accusers confessed to committing perjury to help convict him. 1
In fact, the California Supreme Court and the state Board of Prison recently
reviewed the evidence and concluded that Ryan had been framed.42
Governor Wilson's pardon noted that because Ryan was dead, it was impossible
to comply with California's practice of requiring the individual seeking clemency
to submit her own petition.43 Nonetheless, the governor issued the pardon which
states:
Unfortunately, we cannot do justice for Jack Ryan, the man. But we can do
jstice for Jack Ryan, the memory. And by doing so, we breathe vitality into our
system ofjustice.... Therefore, so that justice is maintained, I grant Jack Ryan
posthumously a pardon based on innocence (emphasis added)."

c.

Arizona

The governor of Arizona, like those of Maryland and California, is vested with
the exclusive authority to bestow pardons. The pardons may be bestowed for any
post-conviction offenses except treason and cases of impeachment. The exercise is
4
also subject to statutory restrictions enacted by the state legislature. 1

39. See Dave Lesher, Dead Man's Name Finally to be Cleared Crime: Investigator Shows
Murder Confession 68 Years Ago Was Coerced L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1996, at 1, attached as
Exhibit 21.

40. See id.
41. See generally Stephen Green, Pardon Still Awaited in 1920s Crime Convictions,
Sacramento Bee, July 10, 1995, at Al; Stephen Green, Terrible Legal Wrong Finally Righted,
Sacramento BeeApr. 16,1996, atAl; Bleys W. Rose, Pardon Sought in 1925 Humboldt Murder
Case, Press Democrat (Santa Rosa, Cal.), July 13,1995, atAl, attached as Exhibits 22,23, and
24.
42. See Stephen Green, Dead Man is Cleared by Wilson, Fresno Bee, Apr. 16, 1996, at B3,
attached as Exhibit 25.
43. The governor noted in the pardon, however, that Mr. Ryan, before his death, had sought
a pardon. See In the Matter of the Clemency Request for Jack Ryan Executive Dept., State of
California (Apr. 15,1996), attached as Exhibit 26. As discussed sura Lt Flipper worked during
his lifetime to clear his name.
44. I.; see also Wilson Grants Posthumous Pardon to Convicted Killer, LA Daily News, Apr.
16,1996, at N9, attached as Exhibit 27.
45. SeeAriz. Const art V, § 5, which states:
The Governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutation, and pardons, after
convictions, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as may be provided by law.
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On November 6, 1990, Governor Rose Mofford of Arizona conferred full and
unconditional pardons posthumously to Joseph L. Chacon, Alex S. Contreras, James
Ellis, and Curtis Springfield. The four men were prison inmates who were killed
while serving as inmate labor on a firefighting detail.4" The seven-member Board
of Pardons unanimously recommended the pardons to the governor in recognition
of the inmates' sacrifice to fight fire.47 Governor Mofford's press secretary was
quoted by one news article as stating: "[i]t's largely a symbolic measure to clear the
names of the individuals who acted above and beyond the call of duty."4"
Thereafter, in the case of Chacon v. United States 48 F.3d 508 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
the next of kin of one of the decedents filed a claim against the U.S. government
under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act. The claim was denied by the
Department of Justice. The denial was later upheld by the Court of Federal Claims
and the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit. !d.at 511. The courts hearing
this case found that the inmates were not entitled to benefits because they failed to
meet the definition of a public safety officer in the Act. However, at no point did
either the Court of Federal Claims or the Federal Circuit suggest that their pardons
had not been effective because they were granted posthumously and, therefore, had
not been accepted. Id.at 513; Chacon v. United States 32 Fed. Cl. 684 (Fed. Cl.
1995).
In fact, in Chacon the Department of Justice never disputed that the posthumous
pardons were valid, even though a finding that the pardons were invalid would have
defeated one of the Chacon plaintiffs' key arguments. Assistant Attorney General
Stuart M. Gerson, by his subordinates in the Commercial Litigation Branch, agreed
that "Arizona Governor Rose Mofford granted all four decedents 'full and
unconditional pardon[s], restoring all [of their] civil rights."' (brackets in original).
See Joint Preliminary Status Report at 5, Chacon v. United States 32 Fed. C1. 684
(Fed. Cl. 1995) (No. 92-715C)."9 In both its trial court and appellate briefs, the
Department of Justice suggested that the issue of the pardons was extraneous, but
never disputed their validity, even though it was in the government's interest to do
0
so.

5

Moreover, in the administrative proceedings preceding the Chacon suit, the
Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs wrote the following:
It was likely fitting and appropriate that the Governor of Arizona posthumously
pardoned the decedents thus recognizing their ultimate sacrifice. No doubt this
act of gratitude and thoughtfulness on the part of the Governor on behalf of the

46. See Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir. 1995). See also Chacon v.
United States 32 Fed. Cl. 684, 686 (1995).
47. See Posthumous Pardons are Urged for 5 Ariz. Daily Star, Oct 3, 1990, at B2, attached
as Exhibit 28.
48. Abraham Kwok, Mofford Expected to Pardon 5 Cons Killed Fighting Forest Fire, Ariz.
Republic, Oct. 3, 1990, at B3. See generally E.J. Montini, Inmate Hurt Fighting Fire Merits
Pardon Ariz. Republic, July 4, 1990, at BI; Art Thomason, Firefighting Victims' Lives
Recounted: Memorial Funds are Set Up as Families Mourn, Ariz. Republic, June 29,1990, at C2,
attached as Exhibits 29, 30, and 31.
49. Attached as Exhibit 32.
50. Excerpts of the government briefs are attached as Exhibit 33.
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people of Arizona was greatly appreciated by the friends and families of the
decedents.
See Letter from Elliot A. Brown, Acting Director, Bureau of Justice Assistance,
Office of Justice Programs dated Aug. 25, 1992 (emphasis added).51
As we demonstrate herein, the pardon power of state governors derives from the
same source as the pardon power of the President: the pardon power of the English
Crown, which includes the power to grant posthumous pardons. Thus, the power
to grant posthumous pardons exercised by Arizona Governor Mofford in Chacon
is the same power that the Constitution invests in the President. The Department of
Justice concession that the Arizona posthumous pardons were "fitting and
appropriate" exercises of the pardon power amounts to an acknowledgement of the
President's ability to exercise the very same power.
There are significant policy reasons to invest the President with the power to
grant posthumous pardons. The Arizona posthumous pardons, given in recognition
ofthe prisoners' supreme sacrifice, harken back to President Madison's pardon of
the Louisiana pirates, who also risked death in the service of their country. Just as
there will be times when a governor finds it to be in the interest of a state to grant
a posthumous pardon, so too there will be times when a President finds it to be in
the interests of our national government to grant a posthumous pardon. Lt. Flipper
presents such a case. Indeed, it would be "fitting and appropriate" to grant a
posthumous pardon to Lt. Flipper, to recognize his significant and exemplary
service to the United States.
2.

Governor Acting in Conjunction with a Board

.Three states that require recommendation by an advisory board as a necessary
condition of clemency by their respective governors-Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
and Oklahoma-have granted posthumous pardons. Once recommendations are
made, however, each governor retains the ultimate discretion to approve or deny the
recommended pardon.
a.

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts constitution authorizes the governor to grant pardons, except
in cases of impeachment. It further imposes two qualifications: (1) the exercise
must be "by and with the advice of council," and (2) in cases of felony offenses, the
state courts may impose specific terms and conditions on the pardon.52 The council

51. Attached at Exhibit 34.
52. See Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 8, which states:
The power ofpardoning offences, except such as persons may be convicted of before

the senate by an impeachment ofthe house, shall be in the governor, by and with the
advice of council, provided, that ifthe offence is a felony the general court shall have
power to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which a pardon may be granted;
but no charter ofpardon, granted by the governor, with advice of the council before
conviction, shall avail the party pleading the same, notwithstanding any general or
particular expressions contained therein, descriptive of the offence or offences
intended to be pardoned.
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is an advisory body comprised of nine individuals, including the lieutenant
governor, which may be assembled from time to time at the governor's discretion.53
Concurrent approval by both the governor and the council is necessary to effectuate
a pardon. 4
In 1977, Governor Michael Dukakis exercised his pardon power by granting
posthumous clemency to Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. Sacco, a
shoemaker, and Vanzetti, a fishmonger, were Italian immigrants who were charged
with stealing more than $15,000 and murdering the paymaster and a guard of a shoe
factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts.55 During their trial in 1921, witnesses
provided contradictory testimony, and the judge and jury were accused of bias. The
prosecution's case was based largely upon questionable forensic evidence and a
paid informant.56 Furthermore, despite the emergence of new exculpatory evidence,
the trial judge had refused to grant a new trial. The conviction of Sacco and
Vanzetti prompted widespread public outcry from those who argued that the
defendants were the victims of anti-immigrant sentiment. In 1925, a man convicted
of another murder confessed to having been a member of the gang that committed
the crimes. Nevertheless, the two men were executed two years later, in 1927.
Governor Dukakis, in issuing the posthumous pardons, asserted: "the stigma and
disgrace should be forever removed from the names of Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo Vanzetti, from their families and descendants."57 (emphasis added)
b.

Pennsylvania

The constitution of Pennsylvania, which is similar to that of Massachusetts,
requires concurrent action by the governor and an advisory body, the Board of
Pardons.5" Unanimous approval of the Board is required in cases involving the

53. See id. § 3, art. I (amended 1855), which states:
There shall be a council for advising the governor in the executive part of
government to consist of [eight] persons besides the lieutenant governor, whom the
governor, for the time being, shall have full power and authority, from time to time,
at his discretion, to assemble and call together. And the governor, with the said
councillors, or five of them at least, shall and may, from time to time, hold and keep
a council, for the ordering and directing the affairs of the commonwealth, according
to the laws of the land.
54. See Ladetto v. Commissioner of Correction 369 N.E.2d 967, 967 (1977) eiina In re
Opinion ofthe Justices, 98 NE. 101, 102 (1912) ("The granting of a full or a partial pardon is the
result of concurrent action by both the Governor and the Council. Neither alone can take effective
action. Both must agree before the Constitution is satisfied.").
55. See Commonwealth v. Sacco2 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1926); Sacco-Vanzetti Case (visited
June 10,1998) <http'//encarta.msn.com/index/concise/0vol8/00eefOO0.asp>, attached as Exhibit
35.
56. See Charles L. Lindner, British Nanny Trial Not the First to Defy Exoectations L.A.
Times, Nov. 16, 1997, at M3, attached as Exhibit 36.
57. Watt Espy, Leo Frank's Due-Process Pardon Raises Concern for Others' Rights, Atlanta
J. &Const., Mar. 29,1986, atAll. See generally Lynn Van Matre, Recordings, Chicago Trib.,
May 9, 1996, at 6, attached as Exhibits 37 and 38.

58. See Pa. Const. art. IV, § 9, which states:
(a) In all criminal cases except impeachment the Governor shall have power to remit
fines and forfeitures, to grant reprieves, commutation of sentences and pardons; but
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death penalty or life imprisonment, and its function is limited to recommending
particular petitions for clemency.59 The state constitution dictates that the
membership of the Board of Pardons includes the lieutenant governor, the state
attorney general, and three other members who are appointed by the governor with
the consent of the state senate.
In 1979, Pennsylvania governor Milton Shapp granted a posthumous pardon to
Jack Kehoe, following a favorable recommendation from the Pennsylvania Board
of Pardons. Kehoe was the reputed leader of the Molly Maguires, a secret group of
Irish coal miners who battled the coal barons of northeastern Pennsylvania in the
1860s and 1870s.60 On April 16, 1877, a jury found Kehoe guilty of the 1862
murder of a mine foreman, and he was executed the following year. The Board
recommended the pardon because Kehoe's trial was conducted "in an atmosphere
of religious, social and ethnic tension' and by a jury that did not include his peers. 6'
In support ofthe petition, the district attorney submitted a letter, dated December 6,
1978, in which he stated the following: "I believe the trial, conviction and execution
of John Kehoe represents a true miscarriage of justice. Therefore, I have no
objections to granting the prayer of the petitioner that John Kehoe be given a
pardon posthumously." 62 (emphasis added)
c.

Oklahoma

In Oklahoma as well, the governor and State Pardon and Parole Board must take
favorable concurrent action in order to bestow a pardon.63 The state constitution

no pardon shall be granted, nor sentence commuted, except on the recommendation
in writing of a majority of the Board of Pardons, and in the case of a sentence of
death or life imprisonment, on the unanimous recommendation in writing of the
Board of Pardons, after full hearing in open session, upon due public notice. The
recommendation, with the reasons therefor at length, shall be delivered to the
Governor and a copy thereof shall be kept on file in the office of the Lieutenant
Governor in a docket kept for that purpose.
(b) The Board of Pardons shall consist of the Lieutenant Governor who shall be
chairman, the Aftomey General and three members appointed by the Governor with
the consent ofamajority ofthe members elected to the Senate for terms of six years.
The three members appointed by the Governor shall be residents of Pennsylvania.
One shall be a crime victim; one a corrections expert; and the third a doctor of
medicine, psychiatrist or psychologist The board shall keep records of its actions,
which shall at all times be open for public inspection.
59. See 1984-88 Pa. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 18 (April 21, 1987), attached as Exhibit 39.
60. See Mary Klaus, WMollV Leader Said Doomed for Aiding Fellow Miners, Harrisburg Patriot
&Evening News, Feb. 19, 1987, at B2, attached as Exhibit 40.
61.Id.
62. See In reApplication ofKehoe, John (PB 6988-M Pa. Bd. of Pardons, no. B-1370 (Dec.
1978) (recommending posthumous pardon for Kehoe), attached-as Exhibit 41.
63. See Okla. Const art. V1, § 10, which states:
There is hereby created a Pardon and Parole Board to be composed of five members;
three to be appointed by the Governor, one by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court one by the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Court ofAppeals or its successor.
An attorney member ofthe Board shall be prohibited from representing in the courts
ofthis state persons charged with felony offenses. The appointed members shall hold
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obligates the five-member Board "to make an impartial investigation and study of
applicants for... pardons... and by a majority vote make its recommendations to
the Governor of all deemed worthy of clemency."" In addition to the
recommendation requirement, the governor's pardon power is subject to the
requirement that offenses be post-conviction, and excludes cases of impeachment.
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating circumvented the concurrent action requirement
when he awarded an honorary executive pardon to J. B. Stradford in 1996.65 The
posthumous pardon cleared Stradford of any wrongdoing in a 1921 riot that
destroyed 35 city blocks and killed an estimated 250 people in Tulsa, Oklahoma."
At a ceremony in which officials formally dropped all charges against Stradford,
Governor Keating bestowed the pardon to Cornelius Toole, Stradford's greatgrandson, a state court judge. According to Stradford's memoirs, racial tensions
turned into a riot when a mob gathered at the Tulsa courthouse and spoke of
lynching an African-American man who was held there for allegedly assaulting a
white woman. Stradford described his role as that of a peacemaker who was trying
to stop violence from erupting. Instead, in the aftermath of the riot, a grand jury
charged him with inciting it.

their offices coterminous with that of the Governor and shall be removable for cause
only in the manner provided by law for elective officers not liable to impeachment
It shall be the duty of the Board to make an impartial investigation and study of
applicants for commutations, pardons or paroles, and by a majority vote make its
recommendations to the Governor of all deemed worthy of clemency. Provided, the
Pardon and Parole Board shall have no authority to make recominendations
regarding parole for convicts sentenced to death or sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole.

The Governor shall have the power to grant, after conviction and after favorable
recommendation by a majority vote of the said Board, commutations, pardons and
paroles for all offenses, except cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with
such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper, subject to such regulations
as may be prescribed by law. Provided, the Governor shall not have the power to
grant paroles if a convict has been sentenced to death or sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole. The Legislature shall have the authority to prescribe
a minimum mandatory period of confinement which must be served by a person
prior to being eligible to be considered for parole. The Governor shall have power to
grant after conviction, reprieves, or leaves of absence not to exceed sixty (60) days,
without the action of said Board.

He shall communicate to the Legislature, at each regular session, each case of
reprieve, commutation, parole or pardon, granted, stating the name of the convict,
the crime ofwhich he was convicted, the date and place of conviction, and the date
of commutation, pardon, parole and reprieve.

64.Id.
65. According to telephone interviews with officials at the Pardon and Parole Board and the
governor's legal counsel office, there is no evidence that Governor Keating utilized the official
pardoning process of recommendation by the Board to grant the pardon.
66. See Oklahoma Officials Clear Black Man in 1921 Riot and Apologize to Family (Tulsa.
Oklahoma Atrocity. J. B. Stradford Who Died in 1935 at Age 75 is Vindicated) Jet,Nov. 18,
1996, at 8, attached as Exhibit 42.
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Governor as Member of the Decisionmaking Body

.InNebraska and Nevada, the pardon power is not vested exclusively in the
governor, but in a decisionmaking body that includes the chief executive of the
state.
a.

Nebraska

Nebraska's constitution creates a triumvirate comprised of the governor, attorney
general, and secretary of state. This three-member Board of Pardons is vested with
authority to grant pardons for offenses against the state, with the exception of
treason and impeachment.67
In 1986, the Nebraska Pardons Board unanimously voted to issue a posthumous
pardon to William Jackson Marion, hanged on March 25, 1887, for the murder of
John Cameron.' Secretary of State Allen Beermann, a member of the Board, noted
that this was only the second request for a posthumous pardon the board has heard
during his 16-year tenure. Marions grandson, Elbert Marion, requested the pardon,
arguing that the coroner had misidentified a skeleton as Cameron, and maintaining
that Cameron was seen alive by two of Marion's relatives four years after Marion's
execution. 69 The Board justified the unconditional pardon by stating "that the public
good would be served by granting such application and that a posthumous pardon
should be bestowed by the government through its duly authorized officers, as an
act of grace."7 (emphasis added).

67. See Neb. Const. art. IV,§ 13, which states:
The Legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of a Board of Parole and

the qualifications ofits members. Said board, or a majority thereof, shall have power
to grant paroles after conviction and judgment, under such conditions as may be
prescribed by law, for any offenses committed against the criminal laws of this state
except treason and cases of impeachment The Governor, Attorney General and.
Secretary of State, sitting as a board, shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures
and to grant respites, reprieves, pardons, or commutations in all cases of conviction
for offenses against the laws of the state, except treason and cases of impeachment
The Board of Parole may advise the Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of
State on the merits of any application for remission, respite, reprieve, pardon or
commutation but such advice shall not be binding on them. The Governor shall have
power to suspend the execution of the sentence imposed for treason until the case
can be reported to the Legislature at its next session, when the Legislature shall either
grant a pardon, or commute the sentence or direct the execution, or grant a further
reprieve.
68. See generally Marion v.State 29 N.W. 911 (Neb. 1886).
69. See Leslie Boellstorff, Posthumous Pardon Given to William Marion (visited June 10,
1998) <http'/nadp.inetnebr.com/marion.html>; Gabriella Stern, Board to Rule Today Grandson
SeeksPardon forMan Hanged in 1887 Omaha World-Herald, Dec. 12,1986, attached as Exhibits

43 and 44.
70. Pardon Proclamation: Inthe Matter of a Posthumous Pardon to William Jackson Marion

Neb. Bd. of Pardons (Dec. 12,1986), attached as Exhibit 45.
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Nevada

.The Nevada constitution vests authority in Board of Pardons and Paroles,
consisting of the governor, five justices of the state supreme court, and the state
attorney general.71 Majority approval of the board is necessary to issue a pardon,
and the governor alone retains veto power. All offenses, except treason and
impeachment, may be pardoned.72 In 1987, the Nevada State Board of Pardons and
Paroles granted posthumous pardons to Morrie Preston and Joseph William Smith,
two union leaders who were convicted of murder in 1907. Some describe the two
men as victims of a conspiracy by the state's mining barons to discredit the labor
movement. At their trial, there was allegedly false, paid tetimony from three key
prosecution witnesses who were all outlaws with long criminal records. 7 ' Governor
Richard Bryan, chairman of the Pardons Board, stated that the pardon was an
acknowledgement on the part of the Board of grave errors in the trial, which
occurred in a highly charged and emotional atmosphere. 74 Of the seven members
on the Board, only Justice Cliff Young voted against the pardon, insisting that the
men were defended ably by their attorneys and ultimately found guilty by a jury of
their peers. 75 According to the transcript of the Pardon Board hearing, Smith's
survivors did not seek the pardon to overturn the two men's convictions. The
Board, in fact, acknowledged that it had no such power to do so, on the grounds that
a determination of guilt or innocence would be too difficult given the passage of

71. See,_2.g., Ex parte Melsevich, 133 P. 57,59 (1913) ("the powers of the board of pardons,
composed of the Governor, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General, are
derived from the Constitution (Const. art. 5, § 14; Rev. Laws, § 307).... .'); State v. Echeverria
248 P.2d 414, 416 (1952) citin State v. Burne 220 P.2d 631, 634 (1950) ("The power to
commute the sentence from death to life imprisonment is vested exclusively in the Board of
Pardons and Parole commissioners by the provisions of § 14 of Article V of the state
constitution.").
72. See Nev. Const art. V, § 14, which states:
1. The govemorjustices of the supreme court, and attorney general, or a major part
of them, of whom the governor shall be one, may, upon such conditions and with
such limitations and restrictions as they may think proper, remit fines and forfeitures,
commute punishments, except as provided in subsection 2, and grant pardons, after
convictions, in all cases, except.treason and impeachments, subject to such
regulations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons.
2. Except as may be provided by law, a sentence of death or a sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole may not be commuted to a sentence
which would allow parole.
3. The legislature is authorized to pass laws conferring upon the district courts
authority to suspend the execution of sentences, fix the conditions for, and to grant
probation, and within the minimum and maximum periods authorized by law, fix the
sentence to be served by the person convicted of crime in said courts.
73. See Jack Viets, Nevada May Finally Undo Old Miscarriage of Justice San Francisco
Chron., May 11, 1987, attached as Exhibit 46.
74. See Pardons in 1907 Slaying Newsday, May 13, 1987, at 15; 2 Unionists Cleared of 1907
Crme, Chicago Trib., May 14, 1987, at 9, ct
Sally Zanjani and Guy Rocha, The Ignoble
Conspiracy: Radicalism on Trial in Nevada attached as Exhibits 47 and 48.
75. See Ed Vogel, Pardoned: Radical Union Men Absolved of Guilt in Goldfield Murder, Nev.
Appeal, May 13, 1987, at A10, attached as Exhibit 49.
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time.76 Instead, the Board granted the pardon as recognition of sufficient doubt
concerning the credibility
of the trial and to promote justice and comfort the
77
surviving family.
4.

Georgia: Extra-Gubernatorial Decisionmaker

The State of Georgia vests the pardon authority, not in the governor, but in a
constituted State Board of Pardons and Paroles."8 This Board's exercise of authority
may be restricted by legislative enactment.7 9 Thus, in Georgia, the governor's only

76. Hearing on Posthumous Petition of Morrie Preston and Joseph Smith Before the Nevada
Board ofPardons, 124-27 (May 12,1987) (transcript of the hearing), attached as Exhibit 50.
77. See id., 124,157-58. See gener
State v. Preston 95 P. 918 (Nev. 1908), reh.g denied
97 P. 388 (Nev. 1908).
78. See Ga. Const art. IV, § 2, para. 2(a), which states:
Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, the State Board of Pardons and
Paroles shall be vested with the power of executive clemency, including the powers
to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles; to commute penalties; to remove disabilities
imposed by law and to remit any part of a sentence for any offense against the state
after conviction.
79. ee id.para. 2(b), 2(c), which states:
(b)(1)When a sentence of death is commuted to life imprisonment, the board shall
not have the authority to grant a pardon to the convicted person until such person has
served at least 25 years inthe penitentiary, and such person shall not become eligible
for parole at any time prior to serving at least 25 years in the penitentiary.
(2) The General Assembly may by general law approved by two-thirds of the
members elected to each branch of the General Assembly in a roll-call vote provide
for minimum mandatory sentences and for sentences which are required to be served
in their entircy for persons convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated
child molestation, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated sexual battery and, when so
provided by such Act, the board shall not have the authority to consider such persons
for pardon, parole, or commutation during that portion of the sentence.
(3) The General Assembly may by general law approved by two-thirds of the
members elected to each branch of the General Assembly in a roll-call vote provide
for the imposition of sentences of life without parole for persons convicted of murder
and for persons who having been previously convicted of murder, armed robbery,
kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated
sexual battery or having been previously convicted under the laws of any other state
or of the United States of a crime which if committed in this state would be one of
those offenses and who after such previous conviction subsequently commits and is
convicted of one of those offenses and, when so provided by such Act, the board
shall not have the authority to consider such persons for pardon, parole, or
commutation from any portion of such sentence.
(4) Any general law previously enacted by the General Assembly providing for life
without parole or for mandatory service of sentences without suspension, probation,
or parole is hereby ratified and approved but such provisions shall be subject to
amendment or repeal by general law.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (b) of this Paragraph, the
General Assembly, by law, may prohibit the board from granting and may prescribe
the terms and conditions for the board's granting a pardon or parole to:
(1) Any person incarcerated for a second or subsequent time for any offense for
which such person could have been sentenced to life imprisonment; and
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role in the pardoning process is to make appointments to the five-member Board.
This Board, however, has granted posthumous pardons to Leo Frank, Samuel
Worcester, and Elihu Butler as acknowledgements of the state's forgiveness."0
Leo Frank, a Jewish factory superintendent, was convicted of murdering 13-yearold Mary Phagan in 1913 and sentenced to death. The Georgia governor
subsequently commuted the sentence to life imprisonment, but an armed mob
chanting anti-Semitic slogans seized Frank from his jail cell on August 16, 1915
and lynched him. No one was prosecuted for Frank's murder. More than seventy
years later, a man testified that as ayoung boy, he saw the janitor of the factory, also
the prosecution's chief witness, carry the limp body of the girl into the basement.
In 1986, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles granted Frank a posthumous
pardon, in recognition of the state's failure to protect and preserve his safety and
civil rights."1
In 1992, the second and third posthumous pardons were simultaneously granted
in Georgia to Samuel Worcester and Elihu Butler, some one hundred and sixty years
after these two Christian missionaries were wrongfully imprisoned for protesting
the state's seizure of Cherokee territory. From prison, Worcester appealed their
convictions to the Supreme Court of the United States. Upon deliberation, Chief
Justice Marshall sided with-the missionaries, declaring that Georgia had no right to
extend state law into tribal land and ordered the missionaries' releases 2 The state
refused to comply, however, and President Andrew Jackson refused to enforce the
order.8 3 After sixteen months of imprisonment, a new governor, Wilson Lumpkin,
discharged the men from prison on a compromise offer. Pursuant to the
compromise, Worcester withdrew his legal appeals in return for the release of the
two men. The pardon document issued by the Board of Pardons and Paroles
concludes with the following:
Today, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles acts to remove a stain on the
history of criminal justice in Georgia. The U.S. Supreme Court did what it could
160 years ago to reverse the wrong committed against Reverend Worcester and
Reverend Butler. Believing iustice ought be denied no longer. by this Order the
State Board of Pardons and Paroles unconditionally and fully pardons Samuel
Austin Worcester and Elihu Butler.' (emphasis added.)
In sum, despite the fact that the degree of decision-making authority given to
these state chief executives varies, they all have granted posthumous pardons.
Governors, lieutenant governors, state supreme court justices, attorneys general,
and secretaries of state from nine different states have all granted such pardons
when public welfare and the interests of justice so require. The pardon power in

(2) Any person who has received consecutive life sentences as the result of
offenses occurring during the same series of acts.
80. Telephone interview with Walt Davis, Assistant Director of Clemency at the Georgia Board
of Pardons and Paroles (June 15, 1998).
81. See Pardon ofLeo Frank Ga. Bd. of Pardons and Paroles (1986), attached as Exhibit 51.
82. See Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
83. See David Corvette, After 161 Years, Two Who Oosed Cherokee Eviction are Pardoned,
Atlanta J. & Const., Nov. 25, 1992, at B4; Tom Watson, 160 Years Later, Georgia Aologizes:
For Cherokee, Pardon HelpsHeal USA Today, Nov. 25, 1992, at A2, attached as Exhibits 52 and
53.
84. Attached as Exhibit 54.

1999]

BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE

1289

some of these states is more restricted than that which the President enjoys. Yet,
even with those restrictions, there has been no suggestion in the records of these
cases that it was improper to grant posthumous pardons.
VII. GRANTING LT. FLIPPER A POSTHUMOUS PARDON WILL CAUSE NO
ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN TO THE OFFICE OF THE
PARDON ATTORNEY
Neither the English Crown nor the U.S. governors' willingness to grant
posthumous pardons has caused undue administrative burdens. There is no evidence
that the British Crown's willingness to grant posthumous pardons has resulted in
a flood of such requests. Indeed, the Criminal Appeal Act of 1995 created the
Criminal Cases Review Commission, which is tasked with reviewing cases arising
in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland for suspected injustice. This Commission
has the authority to seek out and review cases upon its own initiative. This
independent body makes recommendations to the Court of Appeal, which reviews
the conviction.' The Commission has taken over a role formerly filled by the Home
Office. Its recommendations may also be considered by the Queen, who has the
authority to grant posthumous pardons. The British system, therefore, has evolved
such that requests for pardons are not only initiated by the putative grantee or his
representatives, but also by the government itself. Moreover, there is no evidence
that since the monarch has granted two posthumous pardons, she has been besieged
by a burdensome number of such petitions.
Similarly, the states that have granted posthumous pardons have done so on only
one or two occasions, on average. The infrequent grant of posthumous pardons by
the states that have issued them is due to the fact that requests for such pardons are
extremely rare. There have been no requests for posthumous pardons in Georgia
other than those regarding Leo Frank in 1986, and those simultaneously granted to
Samuel Worcester and Elihu Butler in 1992.86 Neither do parole officials in Arizona
recall any applications for posthumous pardons having been submitted since those
granted in 1990Y Nor has there been any such request in Maryland or Pennsylvania
since they granted clemency to Jerome Cardin in 1994 and Jack Kehoe in 1979,
respectively."' Nevada, likewise, has received no requests for posthumous pardons
except for Morrie Preston and Joseph Smith in 1987.89 As Susan J. McCurdy,
Executive Secretary of the Nevada Board of Pardons, noted: " [The Board of
Pardons] thought it was going to open a floodgate. But no, [Preston and Smith]

85. Halsburv's 4th ed. Reissue 1996, Vol. 8(2), 830, at 486; Criminal Appeal Act of 1995,
Pt II §§ 8-25.
86. See Letter from Walton Davis, Assistant Director of Clemency, Georgia State Board of
Pardons and Paroles (July 6, 1998), attached as Exhibit 55.
87. See Letter from Erin Mahoney, Special Hearings Coordinator, Arizona Board of Executive
Clemency (July 16,1998), attached as Exhibit 56.
88. Telephone interviews with Patricia Cushwa, Parole Commission in Maryland (June 10,
1998) and Jennifer Glass, Assistant to the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons
(June 15, 1998).
89. See Letter from Susan J. MeCurdy, Executive Secretary, Nevada Board of Pardons
(July 10, 1998), attached as Exhibit 57.
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were the only ones requested."' 90 Not surprisingly, Nebraska also has received no
petitions for posthumous pardons since 1986, when it granted one to William
Marion.9
The infrequent number of posthumous pardon requests at the state level-where
the bulk ofthe criminal cases in our nation are handled-suggests that petitions to
the President for posthumous pardons will be very rare, indeed. The experiences of
the British Crown and the states, therefore, belie any concern that granting a
Presidential posthumous pardon for the first time in Lt. Flipper's case would lead
to a flood of similar requests.
Even if there were a slight increase in the number of such requests, however,
administrative inconvenience is an insufficient justification to warrant imposing a
blanket rule prohibiting posthumous pardons. As discussed sunra the pardon power
exists to promote the public welfare and remove the stigma incident to an unjust
conviction. There is no legal bar to granting Lt. Flipper a posthumous pardon.
Accordingly, it hardly seems appropriate to refuse to correct the patent miscarriage
of justice in his case because the Office of the Pardon Attorney arguably may see
a slight increase in pardon petitions.
VIII. GRANTING LT. FLIPPPER A POSTHUMOUS PARDON WILL PROMOTE
THE PUBLIC WELFARE
The "public welfare" test is unquestionably met by Lt. Henry Ossian Flipper.
Lt Flipper was an American hero. He overcame tremendous adversity all of his life.
To the day he died, he wanted nothing more than to devote his talents and efforts
to his country. And he did so in a manner that should be admired-indeed,
celebrated by all Americans. He was a soldier, an author, a translator, and a civil
engineer. He was also a civil servant, upon whom the United States government
heavily relied throughout the course of his life in matters of great importance.
Born a slave in Georgia, he overcame great odds to win an appointment to West
Point. Once there, he survived significant racial hazing, thereby earning the
begrudging respect of his fellow cadets. He became the first African-American
graduate of West Point. He graduated well ahead of many others in his class who
were far better prepared for the exacting studies and rigors of that institution-and
who did not have to endure the unremitting ostracism of their fellow classmates.
Upon graduation from West Point, he became the first African-American
commissioned officer in the regular U.S. Army. He took on positions of authority
and respect and demonstrated the leadership skills that he would exhibit throughout
the course of his life.
Despite the pitfalls and injustices that he encountered, he always put his country
first. And his substantial contributions to his country are a matter of record.

90. Telephone interview with Susan J. McCurdy (June 15, 1998). See also Hearing on
Posthumous Petition of Morrie Preston and Joseph Smith Before the Nevada Board of Pardons

at 139-41, attached as Exhibit 50 (oiscussing Board members' concern with the possibility of
"opening the floodgates," and mentioning that "there was no increase in demands for posthumous
pardons" in Georgia subsequent to the Leo Frank pardon).

91. See Letter from Lisa M. Perry, Administrative Assistant, Nebraska Board of Pardons
(July 6, 1998), attached as Exhibit 58.
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His skills as a civil engineer were so formidable that work he did in that field for
the federal government is still in use to this day, and is designated as a National
Historical Landmark. After his service in the Army, his skills as an engineer also
were sought by the private sector. Indeed, when the owners of one private concern
wanted to overrule the wishes of their project manager and refused to hire
Lt Flipper because of his race, the manager-who was also an engineer, had been
a private in the 1st Arkansas Cavalry, and previously had met Lt. Flipper-told the
owners that they had
the choice of either firing him or hiring Lt. Flipper.
92
Lt. Flipper was hired.
His abilities as a translator were so superlative that the United States Attorney
under whom he served stated in briefs to the Supreme Court that:
[Lt Flipper] has translated almost every law from the original Spanish which is
to be found in the various books and briefs filed in these [land claim] cases by
the government The accuracy of these translations, even the coloring of a word,
has never been questioned by any Spanish scholar of standing ... all of his
translations, investigations and reports have stood the test of adverse and
rigorous investigation.'
The high government officials under whom Lt. Flipper served described him and
his work as being "honest" and "reliable" and as having integrity.9" These are traits
to which we, as Americans, aspire each day of our lives. Indeed, the 1904 annual
report of Attorney General of the United States to the Congress, describes Lt.
Flipper's seven-year tenure as a special agent of the U. S. Department of Justice as
follows:
[H]is fidelity, integrity, and magnificent ability were subjected to tests which few
men ever encounter in life. How well they were met can be attested by the
records of the Court of Private Land Claims and the Supreme Court of the
United States. To Mr. Tipton and Mr. Flipper is due the credit of all the expert
work upon Spanish and Mexican archives and the translation of the laws and
decrees applicable to land grants situate in the ceded territory.9
Today, it is time to remove the terrible stigma with which Lt. Flipper unfairly had
to live out the remainder of his life after the untimely conclusion of his Army
service. That stigma endures to this day, and remains an unjust blot upon his
outstanding reputation and character, and that of his descendants. For Lt. Flipper
and his descendants, for the good of the military justice system, and for the good of
our country, today we must turn a new page and make right that which has been
wrong for far too long. Accordingly, the President should grant to Lt. Flipper a full
and unconditional pardon for his conviction for conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman-and by so doing, facilitate the ability of our nation to celebrate to the
fullest extent the magnificent contributions and achievements of a truly great
American.

92. See The Negro Frontiersman Pardon Petition Appendix at Tab A at 21.
93. See Brief ofthe United States in Oposition to Motion to File Additional Evidence in Faxon
v. United States No. 119, Oct Term 1897 at 9; Pardon Petition Appendix Tab B1 at 9.
94. Id. at 7-9.
95. See Annual Report of the Attorney General, 1904, at 99; Pardon Petition Appendix Tab
B2 at 99.
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As demonstrated by American precedent, as well as the experience of the British
Crown and the state governors, there is no proper legal or policy justification for
refusing to issue a posthumous Presidential pardon to Lt. Flipper. Accordingly, for
the reasons stated herein and in his Application for Pardon and its accompanying
Appendix, we respectfully submit that Lt. Flipper's petition for a pardon for the
crime of conduct unbecoming an officer should be granted.
We would be pleased to respond to any questions concerning this matter, either
by way of a further written submission, or in person.

Respectfully Submitted,

Darryl W. Jackson, Esq.
Jeffrey H. Smith, Esq.
Edward H. Sisson, Esq.
Helene T. Krasnoff, Esq.
ARNOLD & PORTER
555 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 942-5000

July 21, 1998
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Exrmrrs
1. Letter from General Swaim to the Secretary of War (excerpted from the Army
Board of Corrections of Military Records, Case Summary).
2. Letter from President Chester A. Arthur (June 14, 1882) (confirming Lt.
Flipper's conviction).
3. Proceedings, In re Henry 0. Flipper (Deceased) (Army Bd. for Corrections of
Military Records Nov. 17, 1976).
4. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 1-2.108 (Supp. 1990-91).

5. Proclamation Granting Pardon to the Western Insurgents, 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 339
(1895); Proclamation Granting Pardon to the Pennsylvania Insurgents, May 21,
1800, 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 343 (1895); A Proclamation, 20 Op. Att'y Gen. 343
(1895).
6. Letter from Jayson L. Spiegel, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army,
Department of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to Roger C. Adams,
Acting Pardon Attorney, Department of Justice (May 5, 1998).
7. Thaddeus Herrick, Where Have All the Heroes Gone?, Hous. CHRON., May 24,
1998, at 7.
8. Letter from Franklin J. Henderson, Colonel and Immediate Past National
President, Ninth & Tenth (Horse) Cavalry Association, to President William
Clinton (June 19, 1998).
9. Letter from James M. McPherson, George Henry Davis Professor of History,
Princeton University, to President William Clinton (June 5, 1998).
10. Letter from Senator Albert B. Fall to Senator James W. Wadsworth (Sept. 9,
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